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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a public interest, law and 
policy center with supporters in all 50 states.  WLF regularly appears before 
federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited 
and accountable government.  In particular, WLF routinely litigates in support of 
efforts to ensure a strict separation of powers—both among the three branches of 
the federal government and between federal and state governments—as a means of 
preventing too much power from being concentrated within a single governmental 
body.  
The remaining amici are all legal scholars specializing in constitutional law 
and related fields.  Based on their substantial legal expertise, they believe that 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the bounds 
of Congress’s constitutional authority.  Amici include Jonathan Adler, Professor of 
Law and Director, Center of Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law; George Dent, Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, 
Case Western University School of Law; Michael Distelhorst, Professor of Law, 
Capital University Law School; James W. Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), amici state that no 
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person or 
entity, other than amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation and submission of this brief.  All parties to this dispute 
have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University Law School; Elizabeth Price Foley, 
Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; David Kopel, 
Research Director of the Independence Institute and Adjunct Professor of Law, 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Kurt Lash, Alumni Distinguished 
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program on Constitutional Theory, 
History and Law, University of Illinois College of Law; David N. Mayer, Professor 
of Law and History, Capital University Law School; Andrew Morris, University of 
Alabama School of Law; Leonard J. Nelson III, Professor of Law, Samford 
University’s Cumberland School of Law; Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger 
Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law; Ronald J. 
Rychlak, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University 
of Mississippi School of Law; Steven J. Willis, Professor of Law, University of 
Florida Levin College of Law; and, Todd J. Zywicki, Foundation Professor of 
Law, George Mason University School of Law.      
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The district court’s grant of summary judgment below should be affirmed. 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which seeks to 
compel most Americans to purchase health insurance by 2014, goes well beyond 
any previous exercise of federal authority.  See §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”).  Even the broadest Supreme Court 
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precedents interpreting the limits of federal power do not give Congress the 
authority to force Americans to purchase a product they do not want.2   
The “first principles” of the Constitution are that it “creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 
(1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45).  As James Madison observed, “‘[t]he 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few 
and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous 
and indefinite.’”  Id.  The federal government, Madison emphasized, is not granted 
“an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.”  THE FEDERALIST  NO. 39.  
These foundational principles are both vindicated and preserved by the district 
court’s ruling below.   
  The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate “economic 
activity” and “noneconomic activity” when controlling the latter is “an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (quoting Lopez).   But nothing 
in the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents gives Congress the power to force 
private citizens to engage in economic transactions they would prefer to avoid. 
                                                 
2 This brief addresses only the Secretary’s Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause arguments.  WLF has previously addressed, in the district court 
below, the Secretary’s Taxing Clause arguments.  See Amicus Br. of Wash. Legal 
Found. & Const. Law Scholars, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli  v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 
3952344, at *17-20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010).   
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 Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the 
Commerce Clause power, the Secretary argues that the individual mandate actually 
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 34.  Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption 
nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans 
whether or not they consume health care services.  If the individual mandate 
operated as the Secretary claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not 
consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed under Section 
1501.    
If, as the Secretary suggests, the Commerce power extends to all economic 
decisions as well as all economic activities, Congress would enjoy unlimited 
authority to mandate any behavior of any kind.  After all, any decision to do (or not 
do) virtually anything has some economic impact.  Nor is there any special 
attribute of the health care market that makes refusal to purchase health insurance 
more of an “economic activity” than any other decision to refrain from purchasing 
any other product.    
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause precedents give 
Congress wide latitude to determine what kinds of regulations are “necessary” to 
the implementation of Congress’s other enumerated powers.  See, e.g., M’Culloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (ruling that such measures 
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need not be “absolutely necessary,” but merely “useful” or “convenient” to the 
execution of other powers).  But they do not give Congress the kind of sweeping 
power asserted by the Secretary in this case.  Indeed, the individual mandate runs 
afoul of at least three of the five criteria for evaluating Necessary and Proper 
Clause cases recently utilized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  Comstock  cited five factors in justifying its decision to 
uphold a claim of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
“(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal 
involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light 
of the government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers 
posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state 
interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.”  Id. at 1965.  A majority of these 
criteria weigh against the individual mandate. 
 Section 1501 also violates the Necessary and Proper Clause’s requirement 
that legislation authorized by it must be “proper.”  Historical evidence suggests 
that “proper” legislation at the very least must not upset the constitutional balance 
of power between the federal and state governments by giving Congress virtually 
unlimited authority.  The logic of the Secretary’s argument for the individual 
mandate does just that.   
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ARGUMENT 
 
I.  THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
 
 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court divides Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers into three categories: (1) regulation of “the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce”; (2) “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “regulat[ion] [of] . . .  
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
558-59; Morrison, 559 U.S. at 609.  
 The individual mandate clearly does not fall under either the first or second 
of these categories.  The decision not to purchase health insurance does not involve 
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.  
Similarly, the mandate is not an example of “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce.”  Id.  The status of being uninsured is neither an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, nor is it a person or thing that travels in interstate commerce.   
 The Secretary’s Commerce Clause argument instead hinges on the third 
category—regulation of “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 
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The fatal flaw in the Secretary’s position is that none of the Supreme Court 
precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause allow Congress to force ordinary 
individuals to engage in commercial activity.   
A.   Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The 
Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity. 
 
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commerce Clause 
does not grant Congress unlimited power.  “The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from 
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of 
legislation.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (“Even 
under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ 
regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.”).        
Even the broadest judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause do not 
give Congress the power to regulate inactivity.  Instead, they strictly limit 
Congress’s authority to the regulation of “economic activity” and noneconomic 
activity whose restriction is necessary for the implementation of a regulatory 
scheme aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions.   
 1. Gonzales v. Raich. 
 The Supreme Court’s most expansive Commerce Clause precedent to date, 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), illustrates this point well.  Raich was the 
first and only case where the Court upheld the regulation of intrastate, 
noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause.  Raich ruled that Congress’s 
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power to regulate interstate commerce could justify a federal ban on the possession 
of medical marijuana that had never been sold in any market or left the state where 
it was grown.  Id.  Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson grew marijuana 
solely for personal consumption for medical purposes.  Id. at 7.  Despite the lack of 
any direct involvement in commerce, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce 
Clause gave Congress the power to forbid this activity.  Although the Secretary 
relies heavily on Raich, see Appellant’s Br. at 30-39, the decision fails to justify 
the individual mandate. 
 Raich interprets Congress’s Commerce power expansively in three ways:  by 
allowing Congress broad authority to regulate “economic activity”; by permitting 
regulation of noneconomic activity as part of a broader regulatory scheme aimed at 
interstate commercial activity; and, by applying a “rational basis” test.  But none of 
these three features of Raich supports the argument that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes congressional regulation of an individual’s decision not to engage in 
commercial activity.  
a. The individual mandate does not regulate “economic activity.” 
 Raich reaffirmed that Congress has the power to regulate “economic 
activity.” It adopted a broad definition of “economics,” which “refers to ‘the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 
25-26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).   
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Expansive as this definition may be, an individual’s mere status of being uninsured 
does not qualify. Choosing not to purchase health insurance involves neither 
production, nor distribution, nor consumption of commodities.  Indeed, an 
individual who chooses not to purchase insurance has chosen not to consume or 
distribute the commodity in question.  Obviously, he or she is also not “producing” 
any commodity by refusing to purchase insurance.  By contrast, the Raich 
defendants were engaged in “economic activity” since they were both producing 
and consuming marijuana.  Id. at 7, 25-26. 
b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of 
noneconomic activity necessary to implement a broader 
regulatory scheme. 
 
 Like Lopez and Morrison before it, Raich indicates that “Congress may 
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a 
more general regulation of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 37; see also Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.  But as all three cases demonstrate, this 
power applies only to the regulation of “noneconomic activity.”  Id.  It does not 
cover regulation of inactivity or the refusal to engage in economic transactions.  
Angel Raich and Diane Monsen had not been inactive or merely refused to engage 
in some transaction.  To the contrary, they were actively involved in the production 
and consumption of medical marijuana.  
 If Raich were interpreted to permit regulation of mere inactivity, Congress 
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would have the power to compel any citizen to help enforce its regulatory schemes.  
It could force individuals to purchase General Motors cars in order to assist the 
struggling auto industry, or purchase financial products from banks that received 
federal bailout funds.  By the same token, Congress could require individuals to 
purchase products from any industry with political clout.  Similarly, it could 
require individuals to purchase memberships in exercise clubs in order to increase 
their physical fitness, which in turn would increase their economic productivity 
and stimulate interstate commerce.  See John H. Kerr  & Marjolein C. H. Vos, 
Employee Fitness Programmes, Absenteeism, and General Well-Being, 7 WORK & 
STRESS 179 (1993) (providing evidence that employee physical fitness reduces 
absenteeism and increases productivity).   
 In sum, there is no limit to the regulatory authority Congress could claim 
under the Sectretary’s sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  The 
federal government would have the power to force citizens to engage in any 
activity that might conceivably affect commerce in some way.  This is precisely 
the kind of unconstrained police power that the Supreme Court has expressly 
rejected.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (noting that “the police power” is “denied 
the National Government and reposed in the States”).  
c.  Raich’s rational basis test does not apply to this case. 
 Raich applied the deferential “rational basis” test to the government’s 
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claims, ruling that “[w]e need not determine whether [defendants’] activities, taken 
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether 
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  The Secretary 
claimed below that the rational basis test should be applied in the present case as 
well, see J.A. at 67-71, and she repeats this argument in her opening brief on 
appeal.  See Appellant’s Br. at 20 (“Congress had far more than a rational basis for 
its finding that such consumption of health care services without insurance 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”).  
 But the Raich Court nowhere indicated that the rational basis test is 
applicable in a case where the government seeks to regulate inactivity, as opposed 
to some sort of positive action.  Rather, the Court explicitly noted that the test 
applied to the government’s regulation of Raich and Monsen’s “activities, taken in 
the aggregate.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).  
 The Secretary appears to assume that Congress’s mere assertion of 
Commerce Clause authority is enough to trigger application of the rational basis 
test.  But neither Raich nor any previous Supreme Court precedent states any such 
thing.  To the contrary, Raich applied the standard only to a regulation of 
“activity.”  
 Neither Lopez nor Morrison applied the deferential rational basis test, 
despite the government’s invocation of the Commerce Clause.  In Morrison, the 
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Court struck down the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act 
despite the fact that the claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce was 
“supported by numerous [congressional] findings” that would have been more than 
enough to pass muster under the rational basis approach.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
614.  Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the rational basis test, the Court’s 
failure to apply the test and its imposition of a considerably higher standard of 
scrutiny strongly suggest that, at the very least, rational basis analysis does not 
apply to regulations of intrastate noneconomic activity such as gun possession in a 
school zone (the regulated activity in Lopez) or sexual violence (Morrison).   
 Indeed, both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that “‘simply because 
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557 (quoting 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 
(quoting identical language from Lopez).  Had Lopez and Morrison applied the 
rational basis test, these decisions would inevitably have gone the other way.  In 
Morrison, Congress had compiled extensive evidence of possible effects of gender-
based violence on interstate commerce.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.  In Lopez, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent indicated a variety of ways in which a rational basis 
existed for believing that gun possession in school zones might have such effects.  
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  As Justice Breyer pointed out, 
if we “ask whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a 
significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and 
interstate commerce . . . the answer  to this question must be yes.” Id. at 618.   If 
the rational basis test does not apply to regulation of noneconomic intrastate 
activity (as in Lopez and Morrison), it surely cannot apply to attempts to reach 
mere inactivity.   
          2. Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the 
Secretary’s position. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s pre-Raich Commerce Clause precedents provide even 
less support than Raich for the Secretary’s position.  As the Court pointed out five 
years before Raich in Morrison, “in every case”  where it has “sustained federal 
regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on 
interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor” and had a “commercial character.” 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4. 
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), a case relied on by the Secretary, 
see Appellant’s Br. at 45-46, was one of the Supreme Court’s broadest 
interpretations of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  Yet its facts 
differ radically from those of the present case.  Wickard upheld the application of 
the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act’s restrictions on wheat production as applied 
to Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his 
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own farm.  317 U.S. at 115, 121-27.  The Court noted that restriction of home-
grown, home-consumed wheat was a necessary component of Congress’s scheme 
to “raise the market price of wheat” because in the absence of regulation, home-
grown wheat could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the market and depress 
demand for the latter. Id. at 127-29.  
 Unlike the instant case, Wickard addressed a regulation of clearly economic 
activity.  Roscoe Filburn sold “a portion of [his wheat] crop” on the market and 
“fe[d] part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold.” Id. at 114.  
Filburn’s wheat production was unquestionably part of a commercial enterprise 
that sold goods in interstate commerce.  As the Court noted in Lopez, Wickard 
“involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone 
does not.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  
 Until Raich, all of the Court’s other post-New Deal decisions sustaining 
exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause addressed 
regulations of economic activity involving the sale or production of goods or 
services.3  Unlike the individual mandate, these laws clearly regulated preexisting 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-280 (upholding regulation of commercial 
mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding regulation of 
commercial loan sharking); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 
(1942) (upholding regulation of price of milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act regulation of employment 
conditions); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding 
National Labor Relations Act regulation of  employment relations). 
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commercial activity. 
  Nor is the individual mandate analogous to those cases upholding civil 
rights statutes that ban racial discrimination by motels and restaurants. See 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding regulation of 
discrimination against customers of a commercial restaurant); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal ban on 
discrimination against customers of a hotel serving interstate travelers).  Such 
federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to preexisting businesses engaged in 
commercial activity in a regulated industry.  By contrast, uninsured individuals are, 
by definition, not participating in the insurance business.  Thus, the individual 
mandate is actually analogous to a statute that requires individuals to patronize a 
restaurant or hotel even if they had no previous intention of doing so.  See Ilya 
Somin, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional Text, 
ENGAGE, Vol. 11, No. 1, Mar. 2010, at 49.  
B.   The Status of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity. 
Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the 
Commerce Clause power, the Secretary argues that the individual mandate actually 
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 34.  Yet the individual mandate purports to regulate neither 
consumption nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured 
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Americans whether or not they ever consume health care services.  If the 
individual mandate operated as the Secretary claims, one could simply avoid the 
mandate by not consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not 
allowed under Section 1501.    
The Secretary attempts to circumvent the constitutional bar on Commerce 
Clause regulation of inactivity by claiming that the state of being uninsured 
eventually qualifies as activity under Supreme Court precedent.  This argument 
comes in two forms: a broad version claiming that any “economic decision” can be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause, and a narrow one focusing on supposedly 
unique characteristics of the health care market.  Both versions fail for similar 
reasons: they end up giving Congress unconstrained power to mandate virtually 
anything, something the Supreme Court has repeatedly said is impermissible.  
 1. Economic decisions are not economic activities. 
 The broad version of the Secretary’s argument claims that any decision with 
economic effects qualifies as an economic activity.  See Appellant’s Br. at 47 (“But 
that type of economic preference is plainly subject to regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.”).  The Secretary cites with approval a district court decision 
upholding the mandate on the grounds that the Commerce Clause reaches not 
merely economic activity but economic choices.  See id. (citing Liberty Univ. Inc. 
v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)).   This recent 
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decision by the Western District of Virginia concludes that “decisions to pay for 
health care without insurance are economic activities . . . .  Because of the nature 
of supply and demand, plaintiffs’ choices directly affect the price of insurance in 
the market, which Congress set out in the Act to control.” Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 
4860299, at *15. 
 The flaw in this argument is obvious.  The “nature of supply and demand” 
means that any decision to do or not do anything will directly affect the price of 
some good or service.  If someone chooses not to purchase a car, that will affect 
the price of cars.  If a person chooses to sleep for an hour rather than work, he will 
earn less money, which in turn means that he will engage in less consumer 
spending or investment, which will affect the prices of various goods.  By this 
reasoning, Congress could not only force people to purchase any product of any 
kind, it could force them to engage in just about any other kind of activity that 
affects the price of some good or service that Congress sets out to control.  
 The Secretary’s “economic decisions” doctrine also contravenes Supreme 
Court precedent.  Under this approach, Lopez would have been decided the other 
way.  Carrying a gun into a school zone—the action forbidden by the Gun Free 
School Zones Act invalidated in that case—is clearly an “economic decision” 
under the Secretary’s reasoning.  In the aggregate, such actions surely have an 
effect on prices in various markets, including the market for guns and the market 
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for illegal drugs in schools.  Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid $40 to carry his gun 
in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to a member of a drug gang who 
probably intended to use it to defend the group’s commercial interests in a “gang 
war.” United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995). 
2. No unique feature of the health insurance market transforms being 
uninsured into economic activity. 
 
 In addition to insisting that Congress can regulate any “economic decision,” 
the Secretary also argues that the individual mandate regulates an “activity” 
because of the special nature of the health care market:  “The means that Congress 
adopted to achieve [healthcare reform] are adapted to the unique conditions of the 
national market for health care services.  Participation in the market is nearly 
universal.”  Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. 
Since everyone eventually participates in the health care market, the 
Secretary reasons, choosing not to buy health insurance does not constitute 
inactivity.  Rather, it is an economic decision to try to consume health care services 
later without paying for them.  See id. at 20 (“When that need arises, individuals 
depend on the extensive medical infrastructure financed and sustained by other 
participants in the health care services market.”). 
 In reality, it is simply not true that everyone consumes health care.  Some 
people rely on charity or home remedies, while others never get sick enough to 
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require medical treatment before they die.  Still, it may well be true that the 
overwhelming majority of people participate in the health care market in 
some way.  But this does not differentiate health care from virtually any other 
market.  
If the relevant “market” is defined broadly enough, one can characterize any 
decision not to purchase a good or service exactly the same way.  The Secretary 
does not claim that everyone will inevitably use health insurance.  Instead, she 
defines the market as “health care services.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The same 
sleight of hand works for virtually any other mandate Congress might care to 
impose.  As the district court below properly noted, “the same reasoning could 
apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions.  This broad definition of 
the economic activity subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation 
and is unsupported by [the Supreme Court’s] Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” 
J.A. at 1097. 
 Consider the case of a mandate requiring everyone to purchase General 
Motors cars in order to help the auto industry.  There are many people who do not 
participate in the market for cars.  But just about everyone participates in the 
market for “transportation.”  In the words of the Secretary, “[w]hen 
[transportation] need[s] arise[], individuals depend on the extensive 
[transportation] infrastructure financed and sustained by other participants in the 
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[transportation] services market.”  Appellant’s Br. at 20.  After all, everyone 
moves from place to place in some way. 
 The same logic can be used to justify virtually any other mandate Congress 
might care to impose—even a mandate requiring everyone to see the most recent 
Harry Potter movie.  After all, just about everyone participates in the market for 
entertainment.  Choosing not to go to the movies is just an “economic decision” to 
try to pay for other entertainment services later. 
 The same flaw undermines the claim that health care is distinctive because 
service providers are sometimes required to provide free care.  See, e.g., Mead v. 
Holder, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).  
The only reason why that difference may be constitutionally relevant is that failing 
to purchase health insurance has adverse economic effects on producers.  But, in 
that respect, failing to purchase insurance turns out to be no different from failing 
to purchase any other product.  Whenever someone fails to purchase a product, 
producers are made economically worse off than they would be if the potential 
buyer had made a different decision.      
Health insurance is undoubtedly an important good.  But it has no unique 
characteristics that transform failure to purchase it into an “economic activity.” 
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to “make all 
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Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Supreme Court has described the Clause as “the last, 
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.” Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).  If the individual mandate cannot be upheld 
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot salvage it. 
 The Secretary contends that the individual mandate is permissible under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because it is needed to effectuate the PPACA’s 
regulations forcing insurance companies to accept customers with preexisting 
health conditions, which in turn is an exercise of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  In its amicus brief opposing the Secretary’s motion for 
dismissal below, WLF provided a detailed argument against the claim that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate.  See Amicus Br. 
of Wash. Legal Found., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli  v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 2661289 
(E.D. Va. June 18, 2010).  Amici incorporate those legal arguments by reference 
here.  
 Here, we emphasize two critical points: that the individual mandate runs 
afoul of the standards for Necessary and Proper Clause claims established by the 
Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949 
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(2010), and that it fails the requirement that any exercise of federal power under 
the Clause be “proper” as well as “necessary.” 
A.  The Scope Of The Necessary And Proper Clause. 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a free-standing grant of power.  
Instead, it gives Congress only the authority to enact legislation that “carr[ies] into 
Execution” other powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle, 
emphasizing that “every . . . statute” authorized by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause “must itself be legitimately predicated on an enumerated power.”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964; see also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247-48 
(1960) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause “by itself, creates no 
constitutional power”). 
 But even if a statute in fact helps to execute an enumerated power, it still 
may not be authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In its famous ruling in 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court outlined several constraints on 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.  
  
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
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 This passage outlines four constraints on the range of statutes authorized by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause: (1) the “end” pursued must be “legitimate” and 
“within the scope of the constitution”; (2) the means must be “appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted to that end”; (3) the means must “not [be] prohibited” elsewhere 
in the Constitution; and, finally (4) the means must be “consist[ent] with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution.”  A statute that is “improper” in nature can be 
rejected as inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the Constitution” or because it 
is “inappropriate.”  
B. The Individual Mandate Fails The Five-Part Test Adopted By The 
Supreme Court In United States v. Comstock. 
  
 In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court held that Section 4248 of 
the Adam Walsh Act was valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-67.  That provision gave federal prison officials the 
power to detain “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners after the completion of 
their sentences.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4248.  The Court cited five factors justifying its 
decision to uphold Section 4248: “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound 
reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest 
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the 
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.”  Id. 
at 1965.  
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 A majority of these criteria weigh against the individual mandate: the lack of 
a deep history of federal involvement, the failure of the PPACA to accommodate 
state interests, and the statute’s extraordinarily broad scope.  A fourth factor (the 
possible lack of “sound reasons” for the statute’s enactment) is potentially 
ambiguous. The fifth—“the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause”—is a 
constant that does not vary from case to case.  See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of 
Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 
2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 260-67 (assessing implications of Comstock for 
the present case). 
1.  No deep history exists of the federal government’s compelling 
individuals to purchase insurance products against their will. 
 
 As the district court emphasized below, the “congressional enactment under 
review . . .  literally forges new ground.”  J.A. at 315.  There is no history of 
comparable federal regulation.  Although the federal government has adopted 
numerous previous statutes regulating health care, it has never compelled ordinary 
citizens to purchase health insurance or other health care products.  It has never 
forced citizens to purchase products of any kind merely as a consequence of their 
status as residents of the United States.  See J.A. at 322 (“Never before has the 
Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this 
far.”).  Nor have the courts ever previously sustained such a statute.  
Comstock relied on a 155-year history of federal involvement in the relevant 
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field.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (tracing the relevant history of federal 
involvement back to 1855). There is no similarly extensive history of previous 
federal regulation remotely comparable to the individual mandate.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court denied Congress the power to regulate insurance policies (for 
health care or otherwise) until 1944, when it overruled longstanding precedents 
forbidding such regulation.  See United States v. S.E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944).  Until only the last few decades, there was very little federal regulation of 
health care of any kind.   
In sharp contrast to the lengthy history of federal involvement at issue in 
Comstock, “[f]ederal involvement in health is a fairly new occurrence in U.S. 
history.”  Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S. 
HEALTH CARE POLICY 67 (Praeger Publishers, 1997) (emphasis added).  “While a 
few laws and special concerns were passed prior to the twentieth century, the bulk 
of the federal health legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed 
in the past 50 or so years.”  Id.  Indeed, modern health care in the United States 
“occupies a completely different place in the economy, in the mind of the public, 
and in its impact on the government at all levels than it did 100 years ago, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, or at the beginning of the country in the late 
1700s, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.”  Id. at 1.     
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 2. The individual mandate does not accommodate state interests. 
 Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act accommodated state interests by 
giving states the option of confining the “sexually dangerous” former prisoners 
themselves.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.  Indeed, it even let states assume 
custody of the former prisoners and then release them.  Id. at 1963.  The federal 
government could only confine a “sexually dangerous” former federal inmate if the 
state government consented to it.  And the state can, if it wishes, assume custody of 
the inmate in question and immediately set him free.  Id. 
 In stark contrast, the PPACA’s individual mandate applies throughout the 
country, even in the many areas where elected state governments oppose it and 
would prefer a different system of health insurance regulation.  Moreover, states 
are not given any right to avoid the mandate or exempt any of their citizens from it.  
Significantly, twenty-seven states4 have now successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, a strong indication that many state 
governments believe the PPACA runs counter to their interests.  Far from 
“requir[ing] accommodation of state interests,” the individual mandate runs 
roughshod over them.  Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1962 (emphasis in the original). 
 
                                                 
4 These include the Commonwealth of Virginia, the plaintiff in the present 
case, and twenty-six states who recently prevailed as plaintiffs in a parallel case 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. See Florida v. 
Dep’t. of Health & Human Serv., No. 3:10-cv-0091-RV-EMT (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
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 3. The individual mandate is extremely broad in scope. 
 Comstock upheld Section 4248 in large part because of its “narrow scope.”  
Id. at 1965.  It emphasized the fact that the statute “has been applied to only a 
small fraction of federal prisoners.”  Id. at 1964.   In marked contrast, the 
individual mandate is extraordinarily broad.  It forces millions of people to 
purchase insurance products against their will.  As the text of PPACA itself 
indicates, “[t]he requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market.”  PPACA § 
1501(a)(2)(C).  
 The individual mandate clearly fails at least three prongs of the five-part test 
laid out in Comstock.  The other two do little to strengthen it.  Whether Congress 
enjoyed “sound reasons” for enacting the mandate is at the very least debatable.  
Many economists believe that it is possible to provide coverage for preexisting 
conditions without resorting to compulsion on the massive scale undertaken by the 
PPACA.  See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, What to Do About Preexisting Conditions, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009.  At the very least, the “sound reasons” underlying the 
mandate are not nearly as clear as those supporting Section 4248 in Comstock.
 The final consideration outlined in Comstock is the “breadth of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1965.  This factor, however, 
is identical in every case.  It cannot by itself justify upholding a statute.  If it could, 
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the other four considerations would be superfluous. 
 In sum, a majority of the factors outlined in the five-part Comstock test 
weigh heavily against the mandate.  A fourth is ambiguous at best.  And the final 
factor never varies from case to case, and therefore cannot be the basis for 
upholding legislation on its own.  
C. The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper.” 
 In order to be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, a statute must be “proper” as well as “necessary.”  See Printz, 
521 U.S. at 923-24 (holding that a law that is not “proper” can exceed the scope of 
Congress’s power under the Necessary & Proper Clause).  The Supreme Court has 
provided very little guidance on the definition of “proper.”  But evidence from the 
Founding era suggests that a proper statute must, at the very least, not depend on a 
constitutional rationale that gives Congress virtually unlimited power to legislate in 
areas traditionally reserved to the states.5 As James Madison explained in 
                                                 
5 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 215-20 (2003) (discussing the relevant 
evidence); Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal 
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,  
297 (1993) (arguing that the evidence shows that “proper” means that laws “must 
be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and 
individual rights”); Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth 
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 (2008) (citing evidence that the original 
meaning of the Constitution  precludes any reading of  the Necessary and Proper 
Clause that has “the effect of completely obliterating the people's retained right to 
local self-government”).   
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Federalist No. 39, the Constitution does not give the federal government “an 
indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39. 
 The Secretary’s interpretation of the Clause threatens to do just that.  
Remarkably, she contends that “[g]overning precedent leaves no room to override 
Congress’s judgment about the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate 
objectives” where a provision is “rationally related to the exercise of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”  Appellant’s Br. at 39, 41.  But virtually any 
imaginable regulatory measure is “rationally related” to some enumerated power in 
some way.  For example, a federal statute requiring citizens to exercise every day 
is rationally related to Congress’s power to raise and support armies.  See U.S. 
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12.  Citizens who exercise regularly might make more 
effective draftees.  Similarly, a statute requiring individuals to wake up early might 
increase their economic productivity by ensuring that they get to work earlier, and 
would thereby be “rationally related” to Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  
 The Secretary claims that such a sweeping interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause was adopted by the Court in Comstock.  See Appellant’s Br. at 
39-41 (quoting Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57).  Comstock did indeed indicate 
that “in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the 
legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the 
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statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57.  But the fact 
that courts must “look to” the presence or absence of a “rational relationship” does 
not mean that this is the end of the constitutional inquiry.  The Court also indicated 
that assertions of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause are subject 
to the five-factor test described above.  If a rational relationship were sufficient in 
and of itself, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize 
enactment of every type of legislation.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court affirm 
the judgment below.  
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